***The Privatization of Good***

1. Does MacIntyre think the right is prior to the good or the good prior to the right? (p. 344f.)
2. What does MacIntyre mean by the “privatization of good” (p. 347)
3. Why does MacItyre think that a grasp of rules requires a grasp of the good?

* 1. Is he right that liberal deny this? (p. 348)
  2. Why would such agreement itself be part of the public life of a Thomist society (p. 345)

1. What does Stout mean by a “moral platitude”? (pp. 348-49) –
   1. On what point does MacIntyre disagree with Jeff Stout? (p. 349)
   2. Why does MacIntyre choose the example of lying?
   3. how would MacIntyre answer the questions about lying?
      1. Is MacIntyre himself a rigorist?
      2. What varieties of untruth would a proper taxonomy of untruth have to include? How would we decide on the rules governing each?

blarney, BS, white lies, bald-faced lies, pick-up lines, trash talk, hype

1. Note the crucial passage on p. 351: whatever rational authority each specification of prohibition on lying has is derived from rational authority enjoyed by a particular conception of the human good – and the role that speech and writing play in it. Why is this important?
   1. What does MacInytre mean by saying that a conception of the good will have to be institutionalized in the life of the community?
   2. What is the contrast MacIntyre means to draw within Aristotelianism? (see pp. 352ff.) what is wrong with the alternative to Thomist Aristotelianism?
2. Privatization deprives of two things (p. 352):
   1. Shared rules
   2. Ability to raise pressing questions in public
3. Explain what is wrong with the way MacIntyre thinks we debate the question of abortion. (p. 353) How does our debate reflect our lack of consensus about the good?
4. Does MacIntyre really expect consensus about the good within, say, Catholicism?
5. What does MacIntyre mean by saying that conceptions of the good can only be matched against one another in “the actualities of … mode[s] of social life”? (p. 355) Cf. his remark on p. 360 about the unity of moral theory and moral practice.
   1. Does MacIntyre really think that, for example, a community dedicated to the care of badly disabled infants will be clearly recognized as a better community, even by those who think selective abortion is permissible? What evidence is there for that?
6. What does MacIntyre mean by saying that every community is a community of inquirers? (p. 358)
7. What kind of institutions would be necessary to institutionalize Thomist Aristotelianism? How different would a Thomist Aristotelian community be from contemporary American society?